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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
THE STATE OF UTAH 
ARTHUR P. DANSAK, and 
ROBERTS. LYON, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
-vs.-
LOUIS C. DELUKE, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Appellant's Brief 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Case 
No. 9355 
The controlling factual question in this case is: 
What consideration did plaintiffs Dansak and Lyon give 
for Lucy Deluke Jones' (now Lucy Deluke) promise and 
consumated agreement to assign to the Sphinx Head 
Mining Corporation its only asset, the lease she owned 
to the Carisa mining property in Utah, and in return 
for which they were to share in the stock of the corpora-
tion? The defendant contends that the discharge of the 
claims which are the subject of the present suit was the 
consideration. The defendant contends that the consu-
mated agreement of March 6, 1957, discharged the 
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claims, and that in any event the actual transfer to the 
corporation of the lease and the action of the Board of 
Directors in formally determining a stock distribution 
did so. 
Before detailing the significant facts, it should be 
noted that Lucy Deluke Jones (known herein as Lucy 
Deluke) is the niece of Louis C. Deluke, the defendant 
in this action. At the time of the transactions here con-
cerned she was the wife of Edwin F. Jones. In the fall 
of 195 7 they were divorced. ( R. 298) 
This action is for money allegedly loaned to the 
defendant, Louis C. Deluke. ( R. 14) The defendant con-
tends that his niece, Lucy Deluke, entered into an agree-
ment with seven other persons, including the plaintiffs, 
to all of whom the defendant allegedly owed money, 
whereby she agreed to assign the Carisa mining lease to 
a corporation to be established, the stock of which was 
to be shared in a considerable amount by the creditors 
of the defendant and in return for which the creditors 
agreed to discharge the defendant's obligations. 
The defendant allegedly owed money totaling about 
$80,000 to six persons in the Phoenix, Arizona, area and 
to Edwin F. Jones, then Lucy's husband. (R. 72, 74, 162) 
About December, 1956, Edwin F. Jones contacted Dr. 
William Rogers, one of the persons to whom the defend-
ant owed money, about the possibility of setting up a 
corporation which would take and work the Carisa lease 
held by Lucy. (R. 128) 
In January or February of 1957, Dr. Rogers invited 
the other five men from the Phoenix area to whom the 
defendant allegedly owed money to a meeting. (R. 74, 
223, 232) These men, all of whom held notes of the 
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defendant, and who attend the meeting are, in addi 
tion to Dr. Rogers: Mr. Paul Wermerskerchen, Dr. Wil-
liam A. McCarey, Dr. Frank Cocuzzi, Mr. Robert S. 
Lyon (plaintiff) and Mr. Arthur P. Dansak (plaintiff). 
(R. 72, 73) The purpose of the meeting of the defend-
ant's creditors was to discuss the setting up of a corpora-
tion for the Carisa mine. ( R. 7 4) 
Following this meeting, though the record does not 
disclose the exact date, this group of creditors to whom 
the defendant owed money retained Mr. Charles Stan-
ecker, a Phoenix attorney, to represent them in the form-
ing of this proposed corporation. ( R. 82, 128) 
Mr. Stanecker actively represented the group, at-
tending several of their meetings ( R. 82) , preparing the 
papers for incorporation and handling the details (R. 
129) , executing correspondence on behalf of the cor-
poration (R. 129), and holding at least one three hour 
conference with Lucy and an attorney representing her, 
Mr. Troy Kennon, from Tulsa, Oklahoma. (R. 132, 133) 
He prepared bylaws ( R. 96), and generally functioned 
on behalf of the Phoenix group. (R. 131, 224) 
According to the evidence introduced at the trial 
various meetings of all or some of the persons concerned 
were held during the winter following the meeting of 
Dr. Rogers and Edwin F. Jones. It is not unlikely that 
there be differences in the testimony as to details of 
these transactions of several years past. In order, how-
ever, to present the picture of the transactions which 
is most favorable to the plaintiffs-respondents' position, 
the major portion of this statement of facts has been 
abstracted from the testimony of the plaintiffs, and par-
ticularly Mr. Robert S. Lyon who served as secretary 
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of the group prior to incorporation and as director and 
secretary-treasurer subsequent to the incorporation. 
(R. 70-130, 214, 226) 
Following these negotiations in January and Febru-
ary of 1957, a meeting was held on March 5, 1957, in 
attorney Stanecker's conference room. (R. 82) Accord-
ing to plaintiff Lyon attorney Stanecker attended this 
meeting (R. 78, lines 5-7) though subsequently Lyon 
became slightly evasive on this question. Also attending 
this meeting with Mr. Stanecker were Lucy Deluke, Ed-
win F. Jones, and the six men from the Phoenix area 
who had retained Stanecker and who held notes of the 
defendant. ( R. 80) 
At this meeting the name Sphinx Head Mining Cor-
poration was selected for the proposed corporation. (R. 
80) The following officers were also selected: Mr. W er-
merskerchen as president, Lucy Deluke as vice-president, 
and Mr. Lyon (plaintiff) as secretary-treasurer. (R. 81) 
The proposed asset of the corporation was discussed at 
this meeting. (R. 83) 
The next evening, March 6, 195 7, another meeting 
was held in attorney Stanecker's conference room. All of 
the proposed incorporators, except Mr. Dansak, were 
present. ( R. 83) Attorney Stanecker who was represent-
ing the Phoenix group was in attendance. (R. 83) 
Though plaintiff Lyon's testimony lacks somewhat 
the consistency generally desired for credibility, his ad-
missions support the defendant's position that an agree-
ment as to the division of shares of the corporation was 
reached in the meeting of March 6. (R. 83, 97, lines 2 
and 3, 100, 105) The agreement was that one million 
shares were to be authorized at one dollar par value per 
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share. Five hundred thousand shares were to go to Lucy; 
two hundred thousand shares were to go to the Phoenix 
group (including Edwin F. Jones) and three hundred 
thousand shares were to be held for possible future pub-
lic issue. (R. 83, 84, 97) 
Following the action on the division of interest there 
was a discussion of the conveyance of the lease to the 
corporation. (R. 85) It was agreed that Lucy would con-
vey the lease to herself and another member of the group 
in trust for the purposes discussed. ( R. 85 ) Pursuant to 
this agreement an assignment in trust to herself and Dr. 
Rogers was executed by Lucy. (R. 87) Lyon did not 
have a recollection when this trust assignment was exe-
cuted. ( R. 86) Lucy testified it was prepared by attorney 
Stanecker and signed by her on the evening of March 
6, 1957. (R. 164) 
Though a question was raised on the motion for new 
trial concerning the accuracy of the thermofax exhibit, 
D-5, it appears that the plaintiffs are relying upon it. 
It recites in part: 
WHEREAS, the said LUCY DELUKE, now 
Lucy Deluke Jones, as assignee of the rights of 
LOUIS C. DELUKE in said lease desires to make 
a further assignment thereof in trust for the bene-
fit of herself and others who have heretofore 
loaned or advanced sums of money to LOUIS C. 
DELUKE~ and~ 
WHEREAS, it is deemed desirable by the 
undersigned and certain of the persons for whose 
benefit this assignment is made~ to form a corpo-
ration to which, upon organization, the lease here-
by assigned will be transferred and for which the 
proposed corporation will cause to be issued shares 
of stock to the persons for whose benefit this 
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assignment is made in such amounts as shall here-
after be determined by the first constituted Board 
of Directors of the proposed corporation, which 
shall include the undersigned and Dr. William 
J. Rogers of Phoenix, Arizona, and such others 
as they shall jointly agree on and which said 
proposed corporation shall be organized forthwith. 
(emphasis added) 
According to plaintiff Lyon, the main business of 
this meeting was the discussion of the value of the Carisa 
lease and the matter of the distribution of the shares of 
the corporation. ( R. 86) 
Articles of incorporation for the corporation were 
prepared in March by attorney Stanecker and signed 
by the incorporators. ( R. 91 ) They were filed in the 
office of the Arizona Corporation Commission on March 
28, 1957. (Exhibit D-6) The incorporators consisted of 
the seven men who held claims against the defendant 
including the plaintiffs in this action, on the one hand, 
and Lucy who had executed the assignment of the Carisa 
lease in trust for the benefit of those who had loaned 
money to the defendant, on the other. One million shares 
of stock at par value of one dollar per share were author-
ized. The eight incorporators were named directors. The 
following officers were named: Mr. Wermerskerchen as 
president, Lucy as vice-president, and Robert S. Lyon 
(plaintiff) as secretary-treasurer. (Exhibit D-6) 
The first formal meeting of the Board of Directors 
following the completion of the incorporation by attor-
ney Stanecker was held in Stanecker's conference room 
in Phoenix on the evening of April 16, 195 7. ( R. 92) 
All of the eight incorporators who now constituted the 
first board of directors, except Mr. Dansak (plaintiff) 
who was out of town on business, were present. ( R. 92) 
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Dansak haJ authorized Lyon to act in his behalf at this 
meeting. ( R. 92) Stanecker was present and advised the 
incorporators of the completion of the incorporation. 
(R. 93) He further advised that the lessor of the Carisa 
lease, the Deer Trail Mining Company, had acknowl-
edged receipt of one quarterly lease payment of $625 
which he had forwarded them on behalf of the corpora-
tion. ( R. 93) 
It will be recalled that Lucy had already assigned 
the Carisa lease previously in trust for the purpose of 
assigning it to the corporation when formed. (Exhibit 
D-5) At this meeting, Lucy and Dr. Rogers who were 
the trustees under the previous assignment, assigned the 
lease to the corporation. (Exhibit D-7, R. 93, 94) 
The Carisa lease was now an asset of the corpora-
tion. It was the only contemplated asset of the corpora-
tion and in fact the only asset ever held by the corpora-
tion. (R. 106, 115) It is clear that certain references in 
the record by Lyon to money contributed to the cor-
poration were in fact references to money advanced by 
the Phoenix group to pay the costs of incorporation and 
which they considered to be money loaned, not con-
tributed as permanent capital. (R. 84 should be com-
pared with Lyon's response to the Court's question 
concerning notes at R. 104) 
Stanecker read bylaws which were adopted. (R. 96) 
Stanecker then proposed a voting trust for Lucy's stock. 
( R. 96) Why this should be necessary to protect the in-
terests of the Phoenix group if, as they contend, they 
gave up nothing for their participation in the stock dis-
tribution of the corporation is not explained by the plain-
tiffs. But in any event, Lucy reluctantly agreed to attor-
ney Stanecker's proposal. (R. 96, 97) 
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At this point the lease had been conveyed to the 
corporation. (R. 93, 94) The corporation was in exist-
ence. A proposal for a voting trust which would give 
control to the Phoenix group had been approved by the 
board of directors. 
Then at this junction, Stanecker proposed that there 
be a redivision of the shares of the corporation. (R. 97) 
This proposal was not voted on at this meeting of the 
16th. The meeting adjourned until the following evening. 
On April 17, 1957, the incorporator-directors met 
again in Stanecker's conference room. Dansak was pres-
ent, but Stanecker was absent. (R. 99) In addition, Char-
lene Penrod, a friend of Lucy's with whom Lucy was 
staying while in Phoenix attended the meeting with Lucy. 
(R. 206) 
At this meeting Lucy and two members of the 
Phoenix group, Dr. McGarey and Dr. Rogers, were 
elected trustees of the voting trust for Lucy's stock. The 
trust was for ten years. ( R. 99, 100) 
Following this, Edwin F. Jones moved that the stock 
distribution agreement of March 6 be approved. (R. 
100) Robert S. Lyon, plaintiff, secretary of the meet-
ing, testified to this in the following words: 
There was a motion by Ed Jones the agree-
ment at the March 6th meeting, regarding dis-
tribution of stock be adopted. It was seconded by 
Lucy. The President called for a question on the 
motion. I, as secretary, reminded the group, on 
suggestion of Attorney Stanecker, that the group 
reconsider the situation, and reminded them of 
the purpose behind it. ( R. 100) 
This motion by Edwin F. Jones did not carry. (R. 
102) Lucy and Edwin F. Jones objected to the proposed 
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redistribution. The meeting became somewhat unruly. 
( R. 207, 21 7) Lucy and Edwin F. Jones left the meeting 
at this time because of the redistribution proposal and 
the failure of the board to adopt the March 6 agreement. 
(R. 105) 
Lyon testified that later in the meeting Dansak made 
a motion for redistribution. In Lyon's words: 
Yes, the motion was made by Art Dansak, 
the motion for redistribution of 250,000 shares 
of Lucy Jones to be held for herself, and who 
she represented, 100,000 for the Phoenix interest, 
and 150,000 to raise capital in the event addi-
tional capital is required. (R. 102) 
Although there is considerable confusion in the rec-
ord because of failure accurately to consider in the dis-
cussions the correct amount of stock which would remain 
unissued according to the proposed redivision, it appears, 
without question, that the following redistribution was 
unanimously approved by the remaining six of the eight 
directors: 250,000 shares to Lucy, (this is in lieu of the 
500,000 which Lyon said was the substance of the March 
6 agreement) ( R. 100, 102, 105), 100,000 to the Phoenix 
group, and 650,000 shares to remain unissued. (R. 104, 
105) 
At this time, again, the Carisa lease was the only 
corporate asset. ( R. 106) 
Though the corporation never went through the 
formality of issuing stock certificates to witness the board 
of directors decision as to the distribution of stock, ( R. 
124) the corporation did other acts as a corporation. 
(R. 108) For example, it continued its attempts to obtain 
DMEA assistance from the federal government. (R. 108) 
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'fhe corporation was dissolved April 25, 1958. (Ex-
hibit P-10) 
Lyon insisted at trial that his participation in this 
scheme by which he and the other members of the 
Phoenix group, to whom it is alleged the defendant owed 
$80,000, obtained the right to stock of a par value of at 
least $100,000 of (and voting control over) a corpora-
tion which had as its one and only asset the lease assigned 
it by the defendant's niece, had no relationship to the 
fact that he and all the Phoenix group held notes of the 
defendant. (R. 74, 75, 77, 107) No place in the record is 
there any explanation of what other consideration might 
have been used to pay for this stock set aside for the 
Phoenix group, nor is there any indication that any other 
mode of payment was ever considered. (R. 75, 107) 
Fallowing the testimony of Lyon which provides the 
basis for the major portion of the foregoing facts (R. 71 
thru 129) the defendant called as a witness Mr. Troy 
Kennon, a practitioner of the law of twenty years ex-
perience from Tulsa, Oklahoma. (R. 132) He testified 
that in February, 1957, he was requested by the defend-
ant to assist and represent his niece, Lucy, at a con-
ference to be held in Phoenix, Arizona, with attorney 
Stanecker of the Phoenix group. (R. 132) Lucy, Kennon 
and Stanecker had a three hour conference. (R. 135) 
The plaintiffs objected vigorously to the admission 
of any evidence of the conference or of Kennon's advice 
to Lucy following the conference. (R. 133, 134) They 
objected to Kennon's offered testimony as to Stanecker's 
statement of authority to speak for the Phoenix group, 
(which the testimony of Lyon had unequivocably estab-
lished that he represented) . The court sustained the 
plaintiffs' objections and the attorney who had repre-
10 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
sented Lucy in negotiations with the attorney who ad-
mittedly represented and guided the Phoenix group's 
interests was not allowed to testify concerning these nego-
tiations. ( R. 82, 96, 224, 129) A proffer of proof to the 
effect that the members of the Phoenix group were re-
linquishing all of their legal obligations against the de-
fendant in return for Lucy's signing her property to the 
corporation was timely made. (R. 137) The court, how-
ever, indicated that it felt the evidence still inadmissible. 
(R. 137) 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO 
FIND THAT THE CLAIMS OF THE PLAINTIFFS 
WERE DISCHARGED BY THE CONSUMATED 
AGREEMENT OF MARCH 6, 1957, WHEREBY 
LUCY DELUKE ASSIGNED THE CARISA LEASE 
IN TRUST FOR THE CORPORATION AND THE 
MEMBERS OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF 
THE PROPOSED CORPORATION AGREED UP-
ON A STOCK DISTIBUTION, OR IN ANY EVENT, 
THAT THE CLAIMS WERE DISCHARGED BY 
THE SUBSEQUENT COMPLIANCE BY LUCY 
WITH ALL TERMS OF SUCH AGREEMENT AND 
THE IMPLIED RATIFICATION THEREOF BY 
THE CREDITORS OF THE DEFENDANT. 
POINT II. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED TO THE MATE-
RIAL PREJUDICE OF THE DEFENDANT IN EX-
CLUDING THE TESTIMONY OF ATTORNEY 
KENNON AS TO THE NEGOTIATIONS BY HIM 
11 
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ON BEHALF OF LUCY DELUKE WITH ATTOR-
NEY STANECKER WHO REPRESENTED THE 
I ' , ' 
PHOENIX GROUP FOR SUCH EVIDENCE IS AD-
MISSIBLE AS EITHER A VERBAL ACT OR AS AD-
MISSIONS OF THE AUTHORIZED AGENT OF A 
PRINCIPAL. 
POINT III. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING 
(FINDING NO. 11, R. 25) THAT "THE DEFEND-
ANT FAILED TO PROVE BY A PREPONDERANCE 
OF THE EVIDENCE THAT THE BOARD OF DI-
RECTORS OF SPHINX HEAD MINING CORPO-
RATION AGREED UPON A DIVISION OF THE 
CAPITAL STOCK OF SAID CORPORATION AS 
TO LUCY DELUKE AND THE PURPOSE OF ANY 
PURPORTED AGREEMENT ENTERED INTO ·BE-
TWEEN THE PLAINTIFFS AND THE SAID LUCY 
DELUKE WAS THEREBY FRUSTRATED WITH-
OUT THE FAULT OR NEGLECT OF THE PLAIN-
TIFFS," FOR THE REASON THAT THE UNCON-
TRADICTED ADMISSION OF PLAINTIFF LYON 
IS THAT SUCH A DIVISION WAS, IN FACT, 
MADE BY A VALID VOTE OF THE BOARD AT 
THE APRIL 17, 1957, MEETING. 
POINT IV. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED TO THE CUMU-
LATIVE MATERIAL PREJUDICE OF THE DE-
FENDANT BY THE EXCLUSION OF EVIDENCE 
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POINT V. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING 
THE DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A NEW 
TRIAL TO DETERMINE THE VALIDITY OF THE 
THERMOFAX COPY OF THE DOCUMENT PUR-
PORTING TO BE THE TRUST ASSIGNMENT 
FROM LUCY TO HERSELF AND DR. ROGERS. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO 
FIND THAT THE CLAIMS OF THE PLAINTIFFS 
WERE DISCHARGED BY THE CONSUMATED 
AGREEMENT OF MARCH 6, 1957, WHEREBY 
LUCY DELUKE ASSIGNED THE CARISA LEASE 
IN TRUST FOR THE CORPORATION AND THE 
MEMBERS OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF 
THE PROPOSED CORPORATION AGREED UP-
ON A STOCK DISTIBUTION, OR IN ANY EVENT, 
THAT THE CLAIMS WERE DISCHARGED BY 
THE SUBSEQUENT COMPLIANCE BY LUCY 
WITH ALL THE TERMS OF SUCH' AGREEMENT 
AND THE IMPLIED RATIFICATION THEREOF 
BY THE CREDITORS OF THE DEFENDANT. 
The uncontroverted evidence in this case can sup-
port but one conclusion. This evidence, mostly in the 
testimony of plaintiff Lyon shows that the six men from 
the Phoenix area who allegedly held notes against the 
defendant jointly retained an attorney, Mr. Stanecker, 
and set out on a concerted course of action to obtain the 
Carisa lease as the sole asset of a corporation to be formed 
13 
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for that purpose and in which corporation they would 
participate as shareholders and ultimately as the con-
trolling interest in the corporation. 
The alleged obligations owed by the defendant to 
these six men (and including the obligation claimed by 
Edwin F. Jones) amounted to approximately $80,000. 
(R. 162) The testimony of Lucy and Mr. Jones clearly 
fills in the obvious memory lapses of the plaintiffs and 
indicates without question that the original agreement 
was to provide stock in the proposed corporation to the 
Phoenix group on a basis of two shares of stock for each 
dollar of claimed indebtedness of the defendant. ( R. 162, 
24 7) At no time was there any discussion or plan on 
the part of the Phoenix group to provide any contributed 
permanent capital to the corporation. The Carisa lease 
was the only asset contemplated for the corporation. It 
was the only asset held by the corporation. It was in fact 
transferred in trust for the benefit of those who held 
claims against the defendant as a result of the agreement 
reached March 6, 195 7. ( R. 86, 164) Examination of 
this trust agreement and the subsequent conveyance to 
the corporation, both drawn by attorney Stanecker, re-
veal, though it was perhaps not obviously intended to 
do so, that the conveyances were for the benefit of the 
defendant's creditors. 
Whether it be assumed that the Phoenix group were 
to receive the higher figure agreed upon on March 6 
by the members of the proposed board of directors of 
200,000 shares of stock or the lower figure of 100,000 
shares of stock which the board of directors arrived at, 
at the suggestion of attorney Stanecker, as a redistribu-
tion of the stock on April 17, 195 7, is immaterial to the 
question of what consideration the Phoenix group gave 
14 
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for such stock. This could only have been their claims 
against the defendant. 
Article 14, section 6, of the Arizona Constitution 
provides that stock shall only be issued to bona fide 
subscribers. The Phoenix group had retained attorney 
Stanecker to represent them. Unless their purpose was 
wholly larcenous, it defies logical experience to assume 
that under these circumstances the Phoenix group con-
sidered that the agreed distribution of stock to them 
was a gift on the part of the niece of the man against 
whom they held claims. Under Arizona law somebody 
had to pay for the stock to be distributed to them. 
Lucy did everything required of her under any in-
terpretation of the agreement. There was no requirement 
that she cooperate willingly and meekly to a fleecing by 
the Phoenix group. 
Plaintiffs Lyon and Dansak insisted at trial that 
their knowing participation in this concerted action by 
the Phoenix group was not in any way related to or con-
cerned with the fact that seven out of eight of the incor-
porators held claims against the uncle of the only other 
incorporator, the incorporator who provided the only 
asset to the corporation. They had the advice of an attor-
ney undoubtedly familiar with Arizona law. It stretches 
the bonds of credibility beyond the breaking point to 
accept their contention that under these circumstances 
it was not intended, expressly or impliedly, by all con-
cerned that the transaction to which Lucy agreed, and 
which was consumated completely by Lucy, did not in-
clude relinquishment of their claims against the defend-
ant. 
The self-serving statements at trial by the plaintiffs 
can have no bearing upon the obvious fact that objec-
15 
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tively a contract Was made, at least ·by the March 6 meet-
ing and completely complied with by Lucy and ratified 
by the subsequent acts of the incorporators. 
The Phoenix group had early sought the advice of 
counsel·- Mr. Stanecker. The subject matterwas a lease 
of partially developed mining property on which had 
been expended thousands· of· dollars of work and money, 
adjacent to Deer Trail Mines. (R. 140, 260) The pro-
posed corporation was to be, and was, incorporated with 
one million authorized shares of one dollar par value 
stock. Negotiations covered a period of. several months. 
Thus h is the defendant's position that the March 
6, 1957, meeting resulted in an accord and satisfaction 
wherein the Phoenix group traded their claims against 
the defendant in return for a promised share. in the. pro-
posed corporation. It was at this time that. Lucy com-
mitted the lease for this ,purpose by conveying it in trust. 
This· position' by the defendant iS not inconsiste~t with 
the further contention that should it be legally held that 
there was not such a result flowing from the March 6 
meeting, that such a result did, nevertheless, obtain from 
the cmitinuati.on of the transactions which saw the estab-
lishment of the corporation, the conveyance of the lease 
to it, and a redistribution. of the stock by the board of 
direc~trs o~ April 17, 1957. . 
· The testimony of Lyon and Dansak is clear and, 
where credible, conclusive~ The documents speak· for 
themselves. 
The plaintiffs are in no position to complain that 
after they received what they had bargained. for, their 
apparent greed and overreaching in trying to obtain abso-
lute and complete control of the entire authorized issued 
16 
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stock (which they did by their voting trust arrangement) 
resulted in Lucy's displeasure and their subsequent aban-
donment of their selfish plan. 
The only tenable conclusion which can be reached 
on the basis of the uncontradicted evidence is that ob-
jectively a· contract was formed whereby Lucy promised 
to convey the Carisa lease in trust for a future corpora-
tion in reurn for a promise on the part of the Phoenix 
group to discharge and release the obligations they claim-
ed against Lucy's unde, Louis C. Deluke. What the 
Phoenix group may have subjectively felt or intended is 
wholly immaterial. · 
'POINT II. 
I 
THE TRIAL COURT. ERRED TO THE MATE-
RIAL PREJUDICE. OF. THE DEFENDANT IN. EX-
CLUDING THE TESTIMONY OF ATTORNEY 
KENNON AS TO NEGOTIATIONS BY HIM ON 
BEHALF OF LUCY DELUKE WITa ATTORNEY 
STANECKER WHO REPRESENTED THE PHOE-
NIX GROUP FOR SUCH EVIDENCE IS ADMIS-
SIBLE AS EITHER A VERBAL ACT OR AS AD-
MISSIONS OF THE AUTHORIZED A9ENT OF. A 
PRINCIPAL. 
The plaintiff offer~d no credible evidence as to the 
nature of the negotiations, their purpose or their terms, 
but relied upon excluding ess-ential eviden~e in an at-
tempt to frustrate the defendant's case. 
On the· one hand, Lucy· and the defendant's wit-
nesses testified to an agreement and to the compliance 
with the terms of the agreement by Lucy. On the other 
hand, the plaintiffs testified squarely to no such agree-
ment, though their testimony is patently untrustworthy 
17 
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in view of the admitted facts. Though it is the defend-
ant's contention that the admitted facts require the re-
versal of the judgment for the plaintiff, it is incontest-
able that at the trial stage any evidence a person of the 
stature of an attorney of twenty years experience, a mem-
ber of a bar of a sister state, could provide as to the 
very crux of the issue - the fulcrum of the case - should 
have been admitted if admissible under any of the many 
rules of evidence. It cannot be said that such evidence, 
had it been admitted, could not have caused a different 
result, and accordingly, to have excluded it is prejudicial 
error if it could have been admitted on any basis. 
Plaintiffs objected to the admission of this crucial 
evidence by a witness who credibility they would have 
found hard to attack, on two grounds: ( 1 ) That agency 
cannot be proved by the admissions of the agent, and 
( 2) that the hearsay rule excluded evidence of the nego-
tiations and the subsequent advice given Lucy following 
the negotiations. 
It is the defendant's position that the Court erred 
as to its interpretation of the facts before it and as to 
the law applicable to those facts in sustaining the plain-
tiff's objection. 
There had already been admitted uncontradicted 
admissions by plaintiff Lyon as to the nature of the joint 
action by the Phoenix group and as to the fact of agency 
by Stanecker and the scope of that agency. Shortly after 
the first meeting of the creditors of the defendant Stan-
ecker was retained to assist them in carrying out their 
purpose. ( R. 82, 128, 131 ) Plaintiff Lyon testified: 
"After Ed Jones had made contact with Dr. Rogers in 
respect to the Carisa lease, Dr. Rogers subsequently 
called a meeting of the people in the Phoenix area seek-
18 
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ing their advice and assistance in forming a corporation, 
and in order to do so we needed an attorney." (R. 128) 
Lyon later testified, "We had employed the attorney 
we felt he was acting for our best interest." (R. 224) In 
addition to the express admissions of the plaintiffs, the 
facts speak eloquently for themselves. Stanecker attended 
various meetings of the Phoenix group, including the 
March 5th meeting ( R. 78) ; he advised Lyon and the 
other incorporators (R. 82) ; he had negotiations with 
Lucy, including the three hour session with her and 
attorney Kennon ( R. 135) . Stanecker undertook and 
completed the incorporation of the corporation on behalf 
of the Phoenix group. ( R. 93) He prepared bylaws. 
( R. 96) He prepared the documents used for assigning 
the lease. (R. 129, 131) He executed correspondence on 
behalf of the corporation ( R. 129) and paid, on behalf 
of the corporation, one of the lease rental payments. 
(R. 93) He was present at the April 16 meeting, repre-
senting the Phoenix group, and at that time he proposed 
the voting trust for Lucy's stock and the redivision of the 
shares of the corporation. (R. 96, 97) 
Consideration of the nature of the transaction for 
which Stanecker was retained clearly emphasizes the fact 
and extent of his agency. Stanecker, an attorney in Phoe-
nix, was retained by the Phoenix creditors of the de-
fendant to represent them in a transaction which called 
for the setting up of a million dollar corporation under 
Arizona law, the obtaining of a lease to mining prop-
erty as the sole asset of that corporation and the distribu-
tion of the stock of that corporation to various persons, 
including the Phoenix creditors of the defendant. 
One can simply ask if under these circumstances 
there is anything more pivotal or crucial, more within 
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the scope of an attorney's agency in setting up a cor-
poration of this type than the relationship between the 
contributed permanent asset of the corporation and the 
consideration for which stock representing that asset is 
to be issued to other than the contributor of the asset. 
Under these facts, the self-serving declarations at 
trial by the plaintiffs that they did not intend, nor au-
thorize, Stanecker to represent them in this aspect of 
the matter are not only suspect, but wholly immaterial 
for it is clear that such matters were within the scope 
of the agent's actual and apparent authority. 
Restatement of Agency 2d, §50 provides 
Unless otherwise agreed, authority to make a 
contract is inferred from authority ·to conduct a 
transaction, if the making of such a contract is in-
. cidental to the transaction, usually accompanies 
such a transaction, or is reasonably necessary . to 
accomplish it. 
And secret instructions to the contrary will not have 
a limiting effect on apparent authority. State Farm Mut. 
Auto. Ins. Co. v. Porter, 186 F.2d 834, 842 (9th Cir. 
1950); 1 Mechem, Agency, §710 (2d ed. 1914). 
The relationship between Stanecker and the Phoenix 
group was that of agent and principal. It was in no 
manner related to litigation or pending or contemplated 
litigation. As stated in Brown v. Hebb, 176 Md. 535, 
175 A. 602, 97 A.L.R. 366 ( 1934) at page 607, 
So far as any general conclusions may be de-
duced . . . it is that an attorney employed with-
out reference to pending litigation is but an agent 
and that his authority to bind pis principal by 
his admissions is not affected by the fact that 
he is an attorney at law except in so far as that 
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fact may reflect upon the apparent scope of the 
agency. 
It is the defendant's position that negotiations be-
tween Stanecker and Kennon were admissible as verbal 
acts, that the Phoenix group, including plaintiffs, had 
clothed Stanecker with actual, and also apparent, au-
thority to represent them, and that. the negotiations be-
tween Stanecker on the one hand and Kennon and Lucy 
on the other are admissilbe as part and parcel of the 
dealings under scrutiny at trial. 
Hawkins v. Parry, 123 Utah 16, 253 P.2d 372 
(1953); 
McDonald v. McDonald, 143 S.W. 2d 142 (Tex. 
Civ. App. 1940); 
6 Wigmore, Evidence, §1770 (3d. ed. 1940). 
In addition to being admissible as verbal acts, fre-
quentely called part of the "res gestae,'; Kennon's testi-
mony should have been admitted as the admissions of 
an agent in the scope of his discharge of his duties for 
his principal. 
While it may be that the fact of agency cannot be 
proved solely by the admissions of an agent, it is equally 
clear that once the fact of agency is prima facie estab-
lished, the acts and admissions of the agent are admiss-
ible against the principal as in other cases. 
Jameson v. First Savings Bank and Trust Co., 40 
N.M. 133, 55 P.2d 743, 103 A.L.R. 1492 
(1936); 
Buchanan v. Wilson, 159 Va. 49, 165 S.E. 422 
(1932); 
Shields v. Oxnard Harbor Dist., 46 Cal.App.2d 
477, 116 P.2d 121 (1941); 
21 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Lowe v. Huckins, 356 Ill. 360, 190 N.E. 683 
( 1934) ; 
1 Mechem, Agency, §299 (2d ed. 1914); 
4 Wigmore, Evidence, § 1078 (3d ed. 1940) ; 
20 Am. ]ur., Evidence, §589; 
31 C.].S., Evidence, §344. 
And this prima facie proof of the fact of agency 
may be established by circumstantial evidence. 
Jameson v. First Savings Bank and Trust Co., 40 
N.W. 133, 55 P.2d 743, 103 A.L.R. 1492 
(1936); 
Brown v. Hebb, 167 Md. 535, 175 A. 602, 97 
A.L.R. 366 ( 1934) ; 
Glover v. Sommerour, 165 Ga. 513, 141 S.E. 211 
(1928); 
Lowe v. Huckins, 356 Ill. 360, 190 N.E. 683 
(1934); 
20 Am. fur., Evidence, §597; 
31 C.].S., Evidence, §344. 
After the prima facie case is shown, the agent's 
admissions as to his authority may be shown. 
jameson v. First Savings Bank and Trust Co., 40 
N.M. 133, 55 P.2d 743, 103 A.L.R. 1492 
(1936); 
Carter v. Carr, 139 Cal.App. 15, 33 P.2d 852 
(1934); 
Under the evidence before the court, and the law 
applicable, there is no doubt that Stanecker was acting 
within the scope of his authority in dealing with Lucy 
and Kennon. 
Professor McCormick, speaking of admissions of 
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The older cases manifest a natural if uncon-
scious tendency to protect the client against the 
hazard of evidence of statements by his attorney 
more strictly than in respect to statements by 
other types of agents. The later cases, properly it 
seems, measure the authority of the attorney to 
make out-of-court admissions by the same tests 
of express or implied authority as would be ap-
plied to other agents, and when they meet these 
tests admit as evidentiary admissions the state-
ments of attorneys in letters or oral conversations 
made in the course of efforts for the collection 
or resistance of claims, or negotiations for the 
settlement of suits or controversies, or the manage-
ment of any other business in behalf of the client. 
McCormick, Evidence, §244, p. 520 ( 1954). 
Recent cases support the proposition that a princi-
pal does not obtain judicial immunity from disclosure 
of the admissions of his attorney-agent in non-litigation 
matters. In Visgilio v. Schoof, 82 R.I. 4, 105 A.2d 470 
( 1954) a letter written by an attorney for the defendant 
in a collection negotiation was admitted to show that 
the letter contained an admission against the client. In 
McGarity v. New York Life Ins. Co., 359 Pa. 308, 59 
A.2d 47 (1948) the court allowed the admission of a 
statement of counsel for an executor as a ground for 
rejecting a claim against the deceased. Lickteig v. Buck-
holz, 129 Conn. 399, 28 A.2d 871 (1942) held that an 
attorney retained to collect a claim was impliedly author-
ized to state to the debtor what the claim was. In Gib-
son v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 147 S.W.2d 193 
(Mo.App. 1941) a letter of an attorney was admitted on 
the theory that it was an admission that no basis other 
than that in the letter existed for a claim. In Suntken v. 
Suntken, 223 Iowa 347, 272 N.W. 132 (1937) the court 
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admitted an admission of fact in an attorney's letter 
writen in the course of negotiations for compromise. 
Similarity between the instant case and Carter v. 
Carr~ 139 Cal.App. 15, 33 P.2d 852 ( 1934) as to the 
principals' in-court denial of agency, makes the court's 
language in that case significant. At page 857 the court 
said 
It has been decided, for example, that, when 
it has been shown that a person was given actual 
or ostensible authority to act for another in a 
particular matter, any declaration made by the 
agent at the time of the transaction of the busi-
ness intrusted or apparently intrusted to him, and 
relating to such business, is admissible as part of 
the res gestae. 
In Carter the proof of agency was considerably less 
substantial and as firmly denied as in the instant case. 
The admissions of the agent were held admissible con-
cerning a transaction for the sale of dairy cows. 
Just as there is no question but that the admissions 
of an agent within the scope of his authority and while 
in the discharge of the duties intrusted or apparently 
intrusted to him are admissible against the principal 
Nuttall v. Holman~ 110 Utah 375, 173 P.2d 1015 
(1946); 
4 Wigmore, Evidence~ §1078, p. 119 (3d ed. 
1940); 
McCormick, Evidence~ § 244, p. 517 ( 1954) ; 
so is there no question but that when men undertake 
joint action such as was done here by the Phoenix group 
to accomplish a common end and retain an agent to rep-
resent them in that venture that the admissions of one 
of them rna y be admissible against the others and that 
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the admissions of the agent may be admissible against 
all of them. 
McCutchan v. Kansas City Life Ins. Co. of Kansas 
City, Mo., 122 S.W.2d 59 (Mo.App. 1938); 
Lowe v. Huckins, 356 Ill. 360, 190 N.E. 683 
( 1934). 
Even had the trial court felt that there was insuffi-
cient evidence of agency before it, it was error consider-
ing the admissions of plaintiff Lyon, to exclude the testi-
mony of Kennon. The trial court has wide discretion to 
admit such evidence subject to later rejection. 
McCormick, Evidence, §60, p. 138 (1954). 
If the evidence of Kennon as to these negotiations 
with the attorney for the Phoenix group was admissible 
on any ground, it was error to exclude it, 
McCormick, Evidence, §59, p. 135 ( 1954) 
and since it was offered by a member of the legal profes-
sion with twenty years experience and related to the 
most important question in issue, and offered the court 
an opportunity to hear evidence in which confidence 
could be placed on material assertions of fact which the 
plainitffs' deny it was prejudicial error to exclude it for 
it cannot be said that had the court heard it he could 
not have reached a decision other than the one he 
reached. 
POINT III. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING 
(FINDING NO. 11, R. 25) THAT "THE DEFEND-
ANT FAILED TO PROVE BY A PREPONDER-
ANCE OF THE EVIDENCE THAT THE BOARD 
OF DIRECTORS OF SPHINX HEAD MINING 
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CORPORATION AGREED UPON A DIVISION OF 
THE CAPITAL STOCK OF SAID CORPORATION 
AS TO LUCY DELUKE AND THE PURPOSE OF 
ANY PURPORTED AGREEMENT ENTERED IN-
TO BETWEEN THE PLAINTIFFS AND THE SAID 
LUCY DELUKE WAS THEREBY FRUSTRATED 
WITHOUT THE FAULT OR NEGLECT OF THE 
PLAINTIFFS," FOR THE REASON THAT THE 
UNCONTRADICTED ADMISSION OF PLAINTIFF 
LYON IS THAT SUCH A DIVISION WAS, IN 
FACT, MADE BY A VALID VOTE OF THE BOARD 
AT THE APRIL 17, 1957, MEETING. 
The only inference which can be drawn from Find-
ing No. 11 is that had the court believed that a division 
was made by the board of directors it would have been 
compelled to find for the defendant, or at least it would 
not have felt precluded from finding for the defendant. 
The division of which the court had reference prob-
ably refers to the language in Exhibit D-5, set forth 
earlier in this brief. It is the defendant' position that 
this agreement was consumated on March 6 by the divi-
sion adopted at that time and by the assignment in 
trust of the lease. If this not be the case, the defendant 
respectfully submits that the court erred, nonetheless, 
for there was a valid division of stock agreed to at a 
meeting of the board of directors on April 1 7, 195 7. 
Plaintiff Lyon's admission at trial that on the eve-
ning of April 1 7, 195 7, at a meeting of the board of di-
rectors of the then incorporated corporation, that the 
board duly approved a motion for division of stock by a 
unanimous vote of a valid quorum, stands uncontradicted 
throughout the record. (R. 102, 122) 
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All members of the first constituted board of direc-
tors were present at the commencement of the meeting. 
At the time of the vote six of the eight members re-
mained and all six voted for the motion of redistribu-
tion of stock. This was valid action by the board. 
2 Fletcher, Cyclopedia of Corporations, §411, 419, 
425 (1954) 
Since no one denies that this action took place, the 
uncontradicted admission of the plaintiff is binding upon 
him. The defendant contends that the March 6 agree-
ment as to division of stock consumated Lucy's agree-
ment with the Phoenix group and discharged the de-
fendant's obligations to the plaintiffs. However, if this 
court determines this not be the case, it is submitted that 
this valid action of the board of directors of the corpora-
tion on April 17, did consumate and ratify the prior 
transaction and thereby discharged the obligations of 
the defendant to the plaintiffs. 
Since the court's finding in this regard is clearly 
contrary to the uncontested admission of the plaintiff 
Lyon, it cannot stand. On this basis also, the judgment 
should be reversed. 
POINT IV. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED TO THE CUMU-
LATIVE MATERIAL PREJUDICE OF THE DE-
FENDANT BY THE EXCLUSION OF EVIDENCE 
MATERIAL TO THE ISSUES BEFORE THE 
COURT. 
The defendant submits that errors already noted are 
sufficient to require reversal. The defendant desires 
to point out several additional errors in the exclusion of 
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evidence, the cumulative effect of which could only ma-
terially prejudice the defendant's case. 
The discussion in Point II concerning the admis-
sion of the statements of an agent and the agency be-
tween those engaged in a joint undertaking is incorpo-
rated herein by reference. 
The errors of which the defendant complains are: 
The sustaining of the plaintiff's objection to the 
guesti?n·, ~s to what the agreement was concerning stock 
distribution at the time Lucy signed the trust assign-
ment. (R. 97) As secretary of the meeting, plaintiff 
Lyon was in a position to know if the proposed distribu-
tion of stock had been agreed to and as to the terms 
of the agreement. · 
The sustaining of plaintiffs' objection as to the agree-
ment between Lucy and Dr. Rogers concerning his claims 
against the defendant. ( R. 145) While it may be that 
similar transactions are generally immaterial, this is not 
the case here for the creditors of the defendant were 
jointly endeavoring to accomplish a given end. What one 
of them did was the business of the others, and legally 
was admissible to show what the group was doing and 
had a bearing on the objective formation of a contract 
between the Lucy and the Phoenix group. In this case 
none of the objections made by plaintiff are pertinent. 
Each participant was the agent of the others. An ade-
quate foundation had been established. It was not neces-
sary that either of the plaintiffs be present at the trans-
action in order for the statements to be admissible. Au-
thorities in Point II are applicable here. 
The sustaining of the objection to the admission 
of the letter from Lucy to Stanecker. (R. 152) This let-
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ter should have been admitted as part of the transaction 
involved. Lucy's understanding of the transaction goes 
to the question of whether there was a meeting of the 
minds on the agreement and to the question of what the 
agreement was. 
The sustaining of the plaintiffs' objection to the 
question whether Stanecker said he was speaking for 
the Phoenix group. ( R. 156) As discussed in Point II, 
an adequate showing of agency had been made and the 
exclusion of the agent's statements as to his authority 
were, in this instance, error. 
The sustaining of plaintiffs' objections and the strik-
ing of testimony of Edwin F. Jones to the effect that 
the creditors of the defendant intended to relinquish their 
claims against the defendant in return for their partici-
pation in the corporation to be formed. ( R. 234, 235) 
The cumulative effect of these errors was to deny 
the trial court evidence on the critical issues of the case. 
It is submitted that this is reversable error. 
POINT V. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL TO 
DETERMINE THE VALIDITY OF THE THERMO-
FAX COPY OF THE DOCUMENT PURPORTING 
TO BE THE TRUST ASSIGNMENT FROM LUCY 
TO HERSELF AND DR. ROGERS. 
It appears that sometime between the taking of 
depositions of Lucy and the defendant and the time of 
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trial, the original of the trust assignment which was in-
troduced at the taking of the deposition was lost or mis-
laid. In its place there was introduced at trial a thermo-
fax document purporting to be a copy of the missing 
trust agreement. 
Affidavits submitted in conjunction with the mo-
tion for new trial, and part of the record here, raise 
a question as to the accuracy and possibly the authentic-
ity of this thermofax copy. It is the defendant's position 
that the trial court erred in not taking evidence on this 
matter since it is material to the issues before the court. 
CONCLUSION 
The defendant submits that the evidence does not 
support a judgment for the plaintiffs. Exercise of this 
court's prerogative and responsibility to review the rec-
ord and the evidence before the trial court will substan-
tiate the defendant's position that the consumated agree-
ment of March 6, 195 7, discharged the notes and obli-
gations on which the plaintiffs now sue, and in any event 
that the assignment of the lease to the corporation and 
the division of stock by the board of directors on April 
17, 195 7, discharged the notes and obligations on which 
the plaintiffs now sue. 
The defendant submits that the remaining points 
in the defendant's brief indicate wherein the trial court 
materially erred to the substantial prejudice of the de-
fendant's right to a full and fair hearing of all material 
evidence on the controlling issues. 
The defendant prays that this court reverse the judg-
ment of the lower court and order judgment entered 
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for the defendant, or if such reversal not be granted, that 
a new trial be ordered with instructions consonant with 
the law in order that the rights of the parties may be 
protected by a full and accurate disclosure of the trans-
actions involved. 
Respectfully submitted, 
GARDNER AND BURNS 
By J. HARLAN BURNS 
Attorneys for the Appellant. 
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